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IMPORTING KAZAA - EXPORTING GROKSTER
Graeme W. Austint
I. INTRODUCTION
From reading the opinions of the Supreme Court in MGM v.
Grokster,1 one might be forgiven for thinking that the legal issues
generated by the advent of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) products and services
are entirely domestic concerns. 2 The Grokster opinions neither take
account of the global dissemination of P2P products and services nor
acknowledge the broad geographic dispersion of many of those
primary infringements the defendants allegedly induced. But the
international aspects of P2P litigation may not remain mere back story
for long; they may become an important aspect of the arduous battle
that continues between the copyright industries and those who seek to
develop new technologies that facilitate the copying and distribution
of digital content. Users of P2P products and services are
"everywhere around the world."'3 Technology entrepreneurs and their
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1. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
2. This article also uses the term "dual-use technologies" to denote technologies that can
be used for both infringing and non-infringing purposes. In addition, as Justice Breyer pointed
out in his Grokster concurrence, such technologies may also be used where the copyright status
of a user's acts are uncertain, where, for instance, copying may or may not constitute fair use.
Id. at 2791.
3. Todd Woody, The Race to Kill Kazaa, WIRED MAGAZINE, Feb. 2003, at 104,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/l 1.02/kazaa.html; Timothy L. O'Brien, King Kong vs. the
Pirates of the Multiplex, NY TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005 at sec. 3, pg. 1 (discussing the prevalence of
pirated movie sales around the world). "At the beginning of 2004, the Kazaa website said over
317 million people, worldwide, had downloaded Kazaa onto their computers, thereby enabling
them to share files." Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd.
(Kazaa) [2005] FCA 1242. (Austl.), Summary (Wilcox, J.), at 2, available at 2005 WL
2119310. Some of the legal implications of the transnational character of P2P networks are
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business partners are often geographically dispersed, and business
structures can be "split" to leverage advantages provided by different
national legal systems.4 The digital content, whose "sharing" is
facilitated by these products and services, regularly traverses back and
forth across international borders. 5 And, of course, parallel litigation
has been initiated in other major jurisdictions. 6
What would the law on P2P products and services look like if
courts directly engaged the issue of the application of domestic
copyright law to conduct occurring in foreign territories? A recent
Washington Post article effectively captures the importance of this
issue, suggesting that the Supreme Court's Grokster decision has
forced all P2P services to "face a choice: Go legitimate, as the music
industry says, shut down, or move outside the U.S. jurisdiction."'7
This article explores this question in light of Grokster and the parallel
September 2005 decision in the Federal Court of Australia, Universal
Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Shaman License Holdings Ltd.,
("Kazaa").8 Though the Grokster service has shut down, issues
relating to the extraterritorial reach of liability theories remain alive,
noted by Professor Peter Yu in P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
653, 677-79 (2005).
4. Grokster and Kazaa involved defendants variously located in the United States,
Estonia, Nevis, the Netherlands, Australia, and Vanuatu. Vanuatu, for example, has strong
corporate privacy laws impeding disclosure of true shareholder lists and company structures.
5. "This system operates world wide." Kazaa, [2005] FCA 1242, Summary (Wilcox, J.),
at 2. (describing the Kazaa Internet P2P file sharing system). See also the statement of Hon.
Mary Beth Peters, "new services that employ peer-to-peer technology create vast, global
networks of copyright infringement." Protecting Innovation and Art While Preventing Piracy:
Hearing on S. 2560, The Intentional Inducement of Copyright Infringement Act of 2004, Before
the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2004) (statement of Hon. Mary Beth Peters,
Register of Copyrights), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=l 276&witid=307.
6. Examples include: In the Netherlands: Kazaa/Buma-Sterma, Hoge Raad der
Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], Dec. 19, 2003, (Neth.). In Norway: The
Oslo Trial Court, Toslo 2004-94328, May 27, 2004 (unofficial translation on file with the
author) (in a criminal prosecution for copyright infringement based on inter alia the defendant's
maintenance and active participation in the operation of a file-sharing hub, briefly adverted to
the international context in which file sharing takes place, and concluded that though the
defendant's actions could have facilitated file sharing between users in Italy and the United
States, the criminal act of "aiding to breach the Copyright Act has been done in Norway, and the
act is therefore punishable."). In Hong Kong: Man Jailed in 1st Copyright Violation Case,
BIZREPORT, Nov. 7, 2005, http://www.bizreport.com/news/9473/ (Nov. 2005 criminal
conviction in Hong Kong for use of the BitTorrent P2P system).
7. Frank Ahrens, June Supreme Court Ruling Taking Toll on Music Sharing,
WASHrNGTON POST, Oct. 1, 2005, at DO1.
8. Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (Kazoo) [2005]
FCA 1242 (Austl.) (appeal pending).
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both for other domestic services and for P2P networks established in
one or more foreign nations that have international effects.
Part II considers the potential impact of the Kazaa decision on
other jurisdictions, including the United States. The Australian
Parliament has enacted legislation that allows courts to apply
Australian law to copyright material that reaches audiences outside its
borders. Implementing the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Australian
copyright law provides a copyright owner with a "right to
communicate the work to the public." 9  As enacted in the
Commonwealth statute, an author's right to communicate the work
includes communications both to and from Australia. This is an
example of a domestic legislature attempting to localize legal liability
for conduct that has significant potential for cross-border effects.
Part III explores the opportunities for applying Grokster's
inducement theory to conduct in foreign jurisdictions. Copyright
owners may have welcomed the new "inducement" theory announced
by the Grokster Court.10 Yet litigants may soon be embroiled in the
task of determining how the theory might apply to conduct that occurs
abroad." Copyright industries may seek to "export" Grokster, and
attempt to add it to extant liability theories that enable U.S. courts to
apply U.S. intellectual property legislation and interpretive doctrine to
activities in foreign jurisdictions. 12 Determining when Grokster might
apply to foreign conduct implicates the principle of the territoriality of
domestic copyright law. 13 Part III first considers the issue of
9. Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act, 2000, Act No. 110 of 2000 (Austl.),
inserting § 31(1)(a)(vi) and 31(1)(b)(iii) into the Copyright Act, 1968, Act No. 63 of 1968, as
amended [hereinafter Australian Copyright Act of 1968].
10. The Grokster Court adapted this theory from U.S. patent law. The Patent Act now
codifies the inducement theory. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(b) (West 2000): "Whoever actively
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."
11. Assuming that simple pressure is not effective. See Reuters, Music sites caving to
pressure from labels?, ZDNET News, Sept. 22, 2005, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9588 22-
5876547.html (discussing the shutting down of some P2P services following receipt of cease
and desist letters).
12. The strategy of applying U.S. law abroad will likely be in addition to, rather than a
substitute for, suing local defendants in their home jurisdictions. See, e.g., Record Labels Target
Baidu in Copyright Suit, Yahoo! Music (Austl.), Sept. 16, 2005,
http://au.launch.yahoo.com/050916/1l/9fkk.html (discussing a copyright infringement action
brought by music licensing organizations against Baidu.com in Beijing, alleging that the
Chinese Internet search engine has been illegally providing links to free digital music
downloads).
13. Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l., Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (describing copyright's territoriality principle as "Copyright
protection is territorial. The rights granted by the United States Copyright Act extend no farther
than the nation's borders." (quoting 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 16.0 (2d ed. 1998))).
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exporting Grokster "de jure," and identifies the potential within the
increasingly fluid doctrine on the territoriality of intellectual property
rights for application of the Grokster inducement theory across
international borders. The paper then considers the issue of "defacto"
exporting of indirect liability theories. Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion in Grokster provides a focus for this discussion. Justice
Breyer, and the two Justices who joined his opinion, would preserve a
robust safe harbor for products and services that are capable of
substantial non-infringing uses. One difficulty with this approach,
however, is that it has the potential to impose on every other nation a
"balance" struck with U.S. economic and technological conditions in
mind. This policy would seem to lead to greater freedom on the part
of the developers of dual-use technologies to act in ways that
facilitate greater circulation of copyright protected works. Absent
geographical filtering, such works are likely to reach users in nations
that see the balance between technological freedom and copyright
protection differently.
In the digital environment, there may be an irreconcilable tension
between the territoriality of intellectual property rights and de jure
and defacto exporting of one nation's copyright policies. Legal actors
will increasingly need to engage with how to reconcile respect for
territorial sovereignty with the inevitability that domestic copyright
policies increasingly have extraterritorial effects. 14 Part IV offers
some preliminary observations about factors that might be relevant to
the task of reconciling this tension in the P2P context, and argues that
public international law norms may provide a useful source of
principles to guide domestic courts as they engage more directly with
the international aspects of P2P litigation.
II. IMPORTING KAZAA
A. Authorizing Copyright Infringement
Kazaa was based on a full record and the judgment was rendered
after a complete bench trial. The Australian federal court began its
analysis with the Australian copyright statute, which expressly
provides that a copyright is infringed by someone who "does... or
authorizes the doing.. .of any act comprised in the copyright."' 15 This
14. See generally, Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict in Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to
Substance, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 931 (2002).
15. Australian Copyright Act of 1968 § 101(1). Early in the trial, Judge Wilcox, sitting as
the sole judge in the Australian Federal Court, apparently directed the parties to focus on the
2006] IMPORTING KAZAA - EXPORTING GROKSTER 581
is the parallel provision to § 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act, which
enumerates the acts that comprise rights of the copyright owner, and
states that the copyright owner "has the right to do and to authorize"'16
those acts. 17 The approach of the Australian court contrasts markedly
with that of the Grokster Court, which did not ground its liability
theory in the right of the copyright owner in §106 "to authorize"
others to do the exclusive acts that comprise the rights of the
copyright owner. Indeed, in U.S. case law, there is very little judicial
analysis of the meaning of "to authorize" in § 106. United States
courts, including the Supreme Court in Grokster have almost
invariably 18 substituted the "authorization" concept with common law
theories of vicarious, contributory, and now, inducement liability. 19
central question of whether the defendants had authorized the infringements by the P2P users.
His Honor observed: "It really comes down to whether or not you can be said to authorise the
infringements and that in turn probably comes down to the question of what.., steps, if any,
you take that can be said to be [by] way of encouragement .... That's what really the case is
about." John Davidson, Billions at Stake in Kazaa Court Case, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL
REVIEW, Dec. 7, 2004, quotation reproduced in Matthew Rimmer, Hail To The Thief: A Tribute
To Kazoo, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 173, 208-09 (2005).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (emphasis added).
17. The 1909 Copyright Act codified a number of forms of liability for the acts of others.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1909) which described the "exclusive rights as to copyright works"
enjoyed by copyright owners, including: (c) To deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or
present the copyrighted work in public for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address or similar
production, or other nondramatic literary work; to make or procure the making of any
transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by
any method be exhibited, delivered, presented, produced, or reproduced[.]; (d) ... to make or to
procure the making of any transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part,
it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or
reproduced[.] Criminalization of willful infringement of copyright under the 1909 Act extended
to persons "who should knowingly and willfully aid or abet such infringement." 17 U.S.C. §
104(b) (1909).
18. A few cases engage somewhat more directly with the meaning of "authorize" in 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2000). See, e.g., Venegas-Hernandez v. ACEMLA 424 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2005)
(tort of authorization of copyright infringement requires proof of infringing act after the
authorization); ITSI T.V. Prods. v. California Authority of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 860
(E.D. Cal. 1992); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1986);
Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, 783 F.2d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir. 1986); Thomas
v. Pansy Ellen Prods., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 237, 241 (W.D.N.C. 1987).
19. Never once did the Grokster Court consider whether the defendants might have been
liable under § 106 for having "authorized" the reproduction or public distribution of copyright
protected works by the P2P subscribers. The Sony Court went so far as to suggest that the statute
is devoid of express language providing for the imposition of liability for the acts of others.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (discussing the
provision for "contributory" liability in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (year), and then
observing of the Copyright Act that "[tihe absence of such express language in the copyright
statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain
parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity") (footnote omitted). The
Court's approach does find support in the House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act, which
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Unlike the U.S. copyright statute, the Australian Copyright Act
provides judges with further, and quite elaborate, guidance on the
concept of "authorization." The Australian Copyright Act lists a
number of non-exclusive factors that courts are required to take into
account, including:
(a)the extent (if any) of the person's power to prevent the doing of
the act concerned;
(b)the nature of any relationship existing between the person and
the person who did the act concerned;
(c)whether the person took any other reasonable steps to prevent or
avoid the doing of the act, including whether the person complied
with any relevant industry codes of practice. 20
These factors build on 21 judicial analyses in a long line of
Australian and Commonwealth cases that have considered the scope
of the concept of infringement by "authorization. '22 However, the
statutory factors are not exhaustive, 23 and they can be supplemented
as the particular facts of cases demand. Significantly, the factors
appear to provide for a finding of authorization in situations in which
the authorizing defendant cannot control the end user. This is implied
explains that use of the phrase "to authorize" was intended to "avoid any question as to the
liability of contributory infringers," and gives the example of someone who, having lawfully
acquired a copy of a motion picture, rents it out for unauthorized public performance. H.R. REP.
No. 1476 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5674; see also S. REP. No. 473 (1975).
Forms of indirect liability in copyright law have long been endorsed by U.S. courts. See Sony,
464 U.S. at 435-36 (discussing Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55 (1911), in which
Justice Holmes considered that the defendant had "contributed" to the infringement of copyright
by others). Many lower court cases have also recognized the concept. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 436
n. 18 (listing cases). The U.S. act's provision for the authorization concept is in the definition of
the rights of the copyright owner, whereas the Australian legislation provides for liability for
authorizing infringement in the definition of infringement.
20. Australian Copyright Act of 1968 § 101(1)(A).
21. The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill that added these factors took
the view that the inclusion of the factors "essentially codifies" the common law development of
the "authorization" tort. REVISED EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM FOR THE COPYRIGHT
AMENDMENT (DIGITAL AGENDA) ACT, 2000 (Austl.).
22. In Commonwealth jurisdictions, infringement by authorization first appeared in the
United Kingdom Copyright Act of 1911. 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46. See generally Ysolde Gendreau,
Authorization Revisited 48 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 341 (2001) (surveying case law).
23. See Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v. Cooper (2005) FCA 972 (Austl.), available
at 2005 WL 1650233, [81] (noting that the factors are "not exhaustive and do not prevent the
Court from taking into account other factors, such as the respondent's knowledge of the nature
of the copyright infringement.").
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by the use of the words "if any" in the first factor of the Australian
Copyright Act.24
In Anglo jurisprudence, the interpretation of "authorise" had
become quite narrow. The House of Lords held in C.B.S. Songs Ltd. v.
Amstrad Consumer Electronics PLC, a case involving a dual audio
cassette player, that "to authorize" means "a grant, or purported grant,
which may be express or implied, of the right to do the act
complained of."'25 This standard was meant to be narrower than an
earlier test that focused on whether the defendant "sanctions,
approves, or countenances" infringement by another.26 In Australia,
however, the High Court maintained the broader test. It held in
University of New South Wales v. Moorhouse27 that authorization
does not require the granting of express or active permission to
infringe copyright. Under Moorhouse, the defendant will be liable for
infringement if: the defendant controls the means by which
infringement takes place; makes that means available for the use of
persons who might use it to infringe; and is indifferent as to whether
or not they do in fact infringe.28
24. Kazaa, [2005] FCA 1242 at [360].
25. C.B.S. Songs Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics PLC., [1988] A.C. 1013, 1054
(U.K.), available at 1988 WL 624207 (per Lord Templeman).
26. The broader test had been articulated by Lord Justice Atkin, as he then was, in Falcon
v. Famous Players Film Co. [1926] 2 K.B. 474 (U.K.), available at 1926 WL 22110 (KBD).
27. University of New South Wales v. Moorhouse [1976] R.P.C. 1141 (Austl.). Decisions
of the High Court of Australia are binding on the Federal Court. The Supreme Court of Canada
recently declined to follow Moorhouse in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada,
[2004] 1 S.CR. 339, in which McLachlin C.J. observed "With respect, I do not agree that this
amounted to authorizing breach of copyright. Moorhouse, supra, is inconsistent with previous
Canadian and British approaches to this issue. In my view, the Moorhouse approach to
authorization shifts the balance in copyright too far in favour of the owner's rights and
unnecessarily interferes with the proper use of copyrighted works for the good of society as a
whole" (internal citations omitted). The Canadian Court also observed "a person does not
authorize infringement by authorizing the mere use of equipment that could be used to infringe
[a] copyright. Courts should presume that a person who authorizes an activity does so only so
far as it is in accordance with the law. This presumption may be rebutted if it is shown that a
certain relationship or degree of control existed between the alleged authorizer and the persons
who committed the copyright infringement." Id. The difficulty under Canadian law will be
determining whether copyright owners could rebut the presumption articulated by the Canadian
court in the P2P context. Doubtless, it is trite to observe that the ability to rebut such a
presumption will depend on the facts of individual cases. Where, however, there are fairly clear
exhortations to infringe ("Join the Kazaa Revolution"), the presumption might be expected to be
rebutted relatively easily.
28. Even in the United Kingdom, however, the narrower test has proven to be quite
flexible, and has been more liberally applied in cases in which courts have identified a "joint
venture" between the supplier and the primary infringer that reveals a common purpose that a
product be used in an infringing way. HUGH LADDIE, PETER PRESCOTT, & MARY VITORIA, 2
THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS 1176 (3d ed. 2000).
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In Kazaa, Justice Wilcox further developed the Moorhouse
authorization principle and tailored it to the P2P context. He
emphasized that the Kazaa defendants were not to be found liable
merely because they provided facilities used to infringe the
applicants' copyrights. 29 "Something more" was required. 30 With
respect to the Sharman defendants, who were the principal operators
of the Kazaa system, Justice Wilcox found that "something more" in
Sharman's promotion of the P2P file-sharing facility,31 its
exhortations to users to use the facility to share files, and its
promotion of the "Join the Revolution" movement on its website, a
movement that, in the court's words, "is based on file-sharing,
especially of music, and which scorns the attitude of record and
movie companies in relation to their copyright works." Justice Wilcox
observed that, "Especially to a young audience, the 'Join the
Revolution' website material would have conveyed the idea that it
was 'cool' to defy the record companies and their stuffy reliance on
copyrights. ' 32 Similar analyses grounded on the specific facts of the
case support the conclusion that most of the other named defendants
had also infringed the applicants' copyrights by "authoriz[ing] the
doing of' the acts that comprise the copyright owners' exclusive
rights. 33
The Australian court also paid close attention to the ability
within the overall Kazaa system to monitor search requests by Kazaa
users. The Kazaa search functionality was two-tiered, involving two
types of "blue" and "gold" files. Sharman had been involved in a joint
enterprise with another firm, Altnet, with the intention of developing
a business to distribute copyright licensed content which eventually
would turn a profit. 34 From the user's perspective, this meant that
both unlicensed and licensed copyright material, the latter
29. Kazaa, [2005] FCA 1242 at [401]. The Court was also concerned to preserve broader
values of freedom of expression. The influence of these factors on Justice Wilcox was clearest
in his discussion of the appropriate remedy "There needs to be an opportunity for the relevant
respondents to modify the Kazaa system in a targeted way, so as to protect the applicants'
copyright interests (as far as possible) but without unnecessarily intruding on others' freedom of
speech and communication." Id. at [ 520].
30. Id.
31. The Australian court referred to a number of firms and one individual as the
"Sharman" defendants. Kazaa, [2005] FCA 1242 at [7].
32. Id. at [405].
33. There are broad parallels with the factors identified by the Grokster Court, particularly
the emphasis on advertising and touting of infringing uses of the services. See Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2779 (2005).
34. Kazaa, [2005] FCA 1242 at [113]. Altnet was also licensed to use the "Kazaa"
trademarks.
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accompanied by digital rights management information, was available
on the Kazaa system. Altnet was able to disseminate licensed material
to users of the Kazaa software in part by monitoring users' "blue" file
searches. Search for the "gold" files was facilitated by a TopSearch
index, which was regularly "pushed" to the computers acting as
Kazaa supernodes. 35 "Gold" files were distributed by Altnet with
metadata, regularly updated according to patterns of users' searches,
which facilitated the sales of "gold" files. If a Kazaa subscriber's
"blue search" search terms matched the terms included in the "gold"
file metadata, Kazaa users were offered "gold" files along with the
results of the "blue" file search.
The Australian court enjoined most of the Kazaa defendants
from authorizing users to reproduce and publicly distribute copyright
protected works, and from entering into a common design to "carry
out, procure, or direct the said authorization. ' 36 The technical
information about the interrelationship between the Kazaa software
and the Altnet search system that was secured through discovery also
enabled the Australian court to craft a ruling that would have allowed
the Kazaa system to operate, albeit, on a different commercial basis,
while implementing protections for the applicants' copyrights. 37 The
court's formal orders are worth reproducing in full:
Continuation of the Kazaa Internet file-sharing system (including
the provision of software programs to new users) shall not be
regarded as a contravention of order 4 if that system is first
modified pursuant to a protocol, to be agreed between the
infringing respondents and the applicants or to be approved by the
Court, that ensures either of the following situations:
(i) that: (a) the software program received by all new users of
the Kazaa file-sharing system contains non-optional key-word
filter technology that excludes from the displayed blue file search
results all works identified (by titles, composers' or performers'
names or otherwise) in such lists of their copyright works as may
be provided, and periodically updated, by any of the applicants;
35. The system gave Altnet knowledge of the IP addresses of the Kazaa users. Id. at [130].
36. The Court also made formal declarations that such infringement had occurred. Id. at
[2]-[3].
37. The development of P2P technologies that allow filtering of copyright protected
material has been the subject of discussion between record labels and technology entrepreneurs,
following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Napster, and, more recently, since the Supreme Court's
Grokster decision. See John Borland, How Label-Backed P2P was Born, NEWS.coM, Aug. 22,
2005,
http://news.com.com/How+label-backed+P2P+was+born/2100-1027_3-5840310.html.
586 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
and (b) all future versions of the Kazaa file-sharing system contain
the said non-optional key-word filter technology; and (c)
maximum pressure is placed on existing users, by the use of
dialogue boxes on the Kazaa website, to upgrade their existing
Kazaa software program to a new version of the program
containing the said non-optional key-word filter technology; or
(ii) that the TopSearch component of the Kazaa system will
provide, in answer to a request for a work identified in any such
list, search results that are limited to licensed works and warnings
against copyright infringement and that will exclude provision of a
copy of any such identified work. 38
B. Kazaa's Extraterritorial Reach
The Kazaa court did not fully delineate the territorial reach of its
holdings or of the remedy it imposed. In its declaration of
infringement, the court described the infringement as "authorizing the
doing in Australia" of Kazaa users' of the infringing acts of
reproducing sound recordings and communicating the recordings to
the public. 39 The Australian statute makes plain that the act
constituting the primary infringement must occur in Australia;
however, it does not specify where the authorization needs to occur.
Consistent with this statutory scheme, Justice Wilcox's holdings on
liability are indifferent to the location where the act constituting the
authorization occurs. Other aspects of the holding and remedy are
likewise only loosely tethered within territorial confines. For
example, the "modifications" of the Kazaa system required by the
Court are directed at the software "received by all new users of the
Kazaa file-sharing system."'40 Similarly, "all future versions" of the
Kazaa system are to include filter technology, and maximum pressure
is to be placed on "existing users," without limitation to those in
Australia, to upgrade to a system that deploys these filters. 41 There
are no apparent restrictions on where those users are located or to
where new versions of the Kazaa system software must be distributed.
To be sure, Justice Wilcox's remedy was limited to placing
"maximum pressure" on users to upgrade to a version of the Kazaa
program that included filtering technology, which is perhaps a tacit
38. Kazaa, [2005] FCA 1242 at [5].
39. Id.at[521].
40. Id. at [5].
41. Id.
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recognition of some of its limitations. 42 Also, the record disclosed that
there was a significant volume of directly infringing activity
occurring in Australia. Even so, there is no suggestion that the court
was specifically concerned about the territorial limits of its holdings
insofar as the acts of authorization (as compared with the direct acts
that were authorized) are concerned.
We might wonder about the source of authority for the court's
facially broad interventions-specifically, about how the holdings
comply with the traditional principle that copyright law is inherently
territorial. 43 Implicitly, at least, the Australian court appears to be
reaching out in an effort to require changes in software and users'
behavior in foreign jurisdictions.44 The territorial restriction in the
court's analysis concerns the direct infringement of reproduction and
communication. This tracks the statutory definition of infringement,
which imposes liability for copyright infringement on one who "does
in Australia, or authorizes the doing in Australia of, any act
comprised in the copyright. '45 This approach is also consistent with
the leading English authority on authorization, Abkco Music &
Records Inc. v. Music Collection International Ltd., where the
English Court of Appeal held that a foreign firm that authorized
infringement of copyright by primary acts within the United Kingdom
was liable for authorizing infringement under the U.K. copyright
statute.46
The approach of the English Court of Appeal in Abkco Music
focused on a close reading of the U.K. statute, but was also grounded
in the commitment by the English courts to the premise that
"copyright is strictly territorial. '47 Professor Paul Goldstein has
suggested that copyright law is concerned principally with the
relationship between authors and their public, a relationship that is
usually manifest in the creation of markets for copyright protected
works.48 The territoriality principle is consistent with this perspective,
42. 1 am grateful to Professor Paula Baron for this observation.
43. Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998).
44. The Australian High Court has recently explicitly engaged in analysis that applied
Australian law to conduct occurring in foreign territory in Dow Jones & Company Inc. v.
Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 (Austl.). available at 2002 WL 31743880. Here, the High Court
determined that an Australian court had jurisdiction over, and could apply Australian law to,
allegedly defamatory statements received in Victoria, but sourced in New Jersey.
45. Australian Copyright Act of 1968, § 36 (emphases added),
46. Abkco Music & Records Inc. v. Music Collection Int'l Ltd., [1995] R.P.C. 657 (U.K.),
available at 1995 WL 1061017.
47. Id. at 660 ("In principle the law of copyright is strictly territorial in its application.").
48. Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 109 (1991).
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to the extent that it recognizes that each nation's copyright laws, taken
together, create those markets.49 The commitment to the territoriality
of copyright is also consistent with the view that the law governing
that relationship should also govern the direct and indirect actions that
threaten or interfere with it. This approach severs the authorization
tort from the primary act of infringement and allows basic principles
of a nation's copyright law, particularly those aspects that determine
the basic rights of authors, to apply within the boundaries of the
relevant nation state. Though the Kazaa court did not address this
point directly, the absence of territorial limitations on the
"authorization" aspect of the liability theory and the potentially broad
reach of the court-imposed remedy indicate that the holding is
consistent with these general ideas.
However, Australian law also offers a far more radically
extraterritorial approach to enforcing the rights of copyright owners.
As part of a package of reforms enacted in 2000, the Australian
Parliament added a new right to copyright owners' bundle of rights:
the right to "communicate" a work to the public. Communicating a
work also includes the making available of copyright protected works
including, for instance, the uploading of a work to a generally-
accessible website. Among other things, the Copyright Amendment
(Digital Agenda) Act (2000) enacted the legislation necessary for
Australia to comply with the WIPO Copyright Treaty ("WCT") which
also includes a right to communicate a work to the public. 50 Article 8
of the WCT provides that "authors of literary and artistic works shall
enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the
public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the
making available to the public of their works in such a way that
members of the public may access these works from a place and at a
time individually chosen by them." Article 8 applies to the full bundle
of rights of the copyright owner, and was intended to pave over gaps
in the rights to disseminate copyright protected works provided in the
Berne Convention.51  The WCT is, however, silent on the
49. In the United States, we are familiar with a number of doctrines that concern that
relationship between copyright owners and their market. In the U.S. system, fair use is an
important example which involves scrutiny of the damage to actual or potential markets. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
50. WIPO Copyright Treaty, parties to treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17
(1997), 36 I.L.M. 65, available at http://wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wctlindex.html.
51. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 43 (1986) (hereinafte- "Berne Convention"). See MIHALY FISCOR, THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET 501 (2002). Parties to the WCT were entitled to incorporate the
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extraterritorial reach of the communication right. As enacted into
domestic Australian law, nonetheless, the communication right has an
express extraterritorial reach. According to Australian law, "to the
public means to the public within or outside Australia." The official
commentary on the legislation made clear that the inclusion of this
definition means that "Australian copyright owners could control the
communication from Australia of their material directed to overseas
audiences."'52 The Australian law on the communication right goes
further than is required by the WCT in this aspect, and thus has the
potential to be "exported" to-and, in effect, "imported" into-every
nation in the world to which copyright protected material might be
communicated without a license. Moreover, the communication right
does not appear to require proof that the communication to users in
foreign territories is itself infringing in the countries where the
communication is received. 53
There are some important limitations on the scope of the
communication right as it is enacted in Australian copyright law.
Consistent with the Agreed Statement in Article 8 of the WCT, 54
which carves out a safe harbor for the "mere provision of physical
facilities for enabling or making a communication," 55 the Australian
treaty obligation into domestic law in their own way. The Australian act applies the
communication right broadly "'communicate' means make available online or electronically
transmit (whether over a path, or a combination of paths provided by a material substance or
otherwise) a work or other subject matter, including a performance or live performance within
the meaning of this Act. " Australian Copyright Act of 1968 s. 10 (Austl.). The accompanying
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36
I.L.M 76 has a more layered approach to the media to which the "communication" right is
applied. See Agreed Statement Accompanying Article 15.
52. DIGITAL AGENDA COPYRIGHT AMENDMENTS: ExPOSURE DRAFT AND COMMENTARY,
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill at [28] (Feb. 1999).
53. There are parallels in U.S. case law on the "predicate act" theory, which makes
pecuniary relief available under U.S. copyright law for foreign infringements facilitated by the
making of an unlicensed copy within the United States. In an early case recognizing this
principle in the context of allegations of unlicensed exploitation of a copyright protected work in
Canada, the Second Circuit imposed liability on the defendant in circumstances where the
plaintiff had not established the content of the foreign law, observing "[t]he plaintiffs made no
proof of foreign law, and we cannot say that the exhibition.. abroad was a tort." Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1939), aff'd on other grounds, 309 U.S. 390
(1940).
54. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 50. The text of the "Agreed Statement
Concerning Article 8" provides in material part "It is understood that the mere provision of
physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to
communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention."
55. The following passage from the Kazaa opinion usefully recounts the legislative
history, and the relationship between the WCT and the Australian legislation, as it applies to
"physical" facilities: "The original exposure draft of the Copyright Amendment (Digital
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Copyright Act provides that a person, including an ISP, who provides
facilities for making, or facilitating the making of, a communication is
not taken to have authorized any infringement of copyright in a work
"merely because another person uses the facilities so provided to do
something the right to do which is included in the copyright. '56
Additionally, the Australian Act appears to limit direct liability for
unlicensed communication by defining the person making the
communication as "the person responsible for determining the content
of the communication.1 57  One cannot be held liable for
communicating a work to the public merely by providing the facilities
by which a communication is made; one must be responsible for
determining the content of the communication. Because users
generally determine the content of communications facilitated by P2P
networks, there may be significant obstacles to imposing liability on
those responsible for providing P2P products or services that directly
communicate a work to the public. Here, the authorization concept
once more becomes critical. As was noted above, the court identified
factors that enabled it to hold that the Kazaa defendants did more than
"merely" provide facilities because they did in fact authorize such
communications. 58
If we layer the territorially-confined "authorization" tort onto the
extraterritorial "communication" concept, we see that Australian law
might offer copyright owners a powerful legal mechanism capable of
reaching many unlicensed foreign communications of copyright
protected works. Assume that the users of P2P services are considered
responsible for the content of the communication, for instance, by
making copyright protected works available for downloading by
others (works they have at some stage selected themselves by
Agenda) Bill 1999, which was prepared in February 1999, contained a draft section 112C
(ultimately section 1 12E) which provided [emphasis added], "A carrier or a carriage service
provider is not taken to have authorized any infringement of a copyright in a cinematograph
film, a sound recording, a television broadcast or a sound broadcast merely because he or she
provides physical facilities used by a person to do something the right to do which is included in
the copyright." In subsequent versions of the Bill the word "physical" was omitted, as it was
from the precursor to section 39B. The Explanatory Memorandum for a later version of the
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999 included the statement "The reference to
"facilities" is intended to include physical facilities and the use of cellular satellite and other
technologies. The legislative history of this provision (and its counterpart section, 39B) makes it
quite clear that a conscious choice was made to omit the word 'physical' and not limit the
operation of the section in the manner suggested by the Applicants." See also Kazaa, [2005]
FCA 1242 at [393].
56. Australian Copyright Act of 1968, § 39B.
57. Id. at § 22.
58. Kazaa, [2005] FCA 1242 at [399].
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downloading them from other users): They are then primarily liable
for all communications, domestic and foreign. But if a party is liable
for authorizing those unlicensed communications, the indirect liability
theory also has the potential to reach both communications within
Australia and communications made to P2P users in foreign
territories. Moreover, because the Anglo-Australian approach to
localizing the authorization does not appear to require the act of
authorization itself to have occurred within Australia, a firm operating
outside of Australia may, in some circumstances, be found to have
authorized communications that begin from Australia, even if the
communications themselves are directed or made available to users
outside of Australia. Put another way, the Australian regime seems to
suggest that so long as there is a "communicator" located in Australia,
Australian law can reach the conduct of a U.K. firm whose conduct
can be characterized as "authorizing" infringing communications to
the U.K. and every other country to which the communication is
transmitted. 59
Outside of Australia there are still further extraterritorial
possibilities. In some jurisdictions, courts are willing to ascertain and
apply foreign copyright laws. Some U.S. courts have suggested that
trial courts should determine and apply foreign intellectual property
laws.60 The English Court of Appeal,61 at least within the ambit of the
(then) Brussels Convention, and probably further,62 has indicated that
foreign copyright laws are justiciable in domestic fora. 63 Suppose
such a court is seized of a dispute in which application of Australian
copyright law is appropriate and the allegations include unlicensed
reproductions and distributions in Australia in addition to unlicensed
communications from Australia. 64 A foreign court that is willing to
59. Because the communication principle also includes "making available" a copyright
work, it does not appear to be necessary for the work to reach anyone, so long as it is
internationally accessible. However, at least in theory, remedies might be different where a work
is actually downloaded by foreign users, as compared with mere "exposure" for download.
60. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481
(2d Cir. 1998).
61. Pearce v. Ove Arup [1999] 1 All E.R. 769 (Eng.).
62. The English Court of Appeal in Pearce considered an English Court's subject matter
jurisdiction over allegations of copyright infringement in the Netherlands first under the
Brussels Convention, and then according to general common law principles, suggesting that the
ruling has significance outside of the European Union. See id. at 770.
63. Id.
64. This assumes that the cause of action is not dismissed by the local forum applying
forum non conveniens principles. However, for English courts the European Court of Justice
has held thatforum non conveniens is not available even where one of the nations is not a party
to the Brussels Regulation. See Owusu v Jackson, Case C-281/02, available at 2005 WL
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apply Australian copyright law at all will need to consider whether it
is appropriate to apply those aspects of Australian law that have
extraterritorial reach, as determined by the Australian Parliament.
This will involve the courts of one nation contending with the
implications of another nation's express rebuttal of the premise that
domestic legislation has no extraterritorial reach.
III. EXPORTING GROKSTER
The foregoing discussion of the Kazaa case indicates that the
localization of foreign infringements in domestic copyright statutes
offers copyright owners some potentially powerful liability principles
that might reach conduct in foreign territories. 65 While some of these
liability theories, particularly those that reach communications from
one nation that are to be received in other nations, may seem an
affront to the traditional territoriality principle, so too is massive
unlicensed distribution of copyright protected material by parties who
are themselves indifferent to territorial boundaries. As Kazaa and
Grokster indicate, for some legal actors, attempting to stop the flow
of massive amounts of unlicensed distribution of copyright-protected
material may prove to be more important than the niceties of
copyright's territoriality principle.
The territorial scope of the inducement principle was not before
the Grokster Court. Even so, it is worth observing the facts that were
relevant to the test it articulated when dealing with significant
amounts of foreign conduct. This brings to the foreground a number
of questions that the Grokster Court avoided. For example, are all
uses "promoted" by P2P services relevant to determining if the
defendant induced copyright liability, including those that occur
474200, which overturns Re Harrods Buenos Aires Ltd. [1992] Ch 72 (Eng.), in which the
English Court of Appeal had adopted the opposite view.
65. Australia is not alone in its localization of communication of copyright protected
material to foreign territories. See generally Daniel J. Gervais, Transmissions of Music on the
Internet: An Analysis of the Copyright Laws of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, 34 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1363 (2001). The Canadian
Supreme Court recently suggested that a "communication" of a digital file "in Canada" includes
communications to and from Canada. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of
Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers, [2004] S.C.R 427, 455. The Canadian
Court recognized that its rule created the potential for duplicative liability for cross-border
transmissions, liability under Canadian law, and under the law of the place of receipt - but
considered that resolution of this issue should be a matter of treaty negotiations. Id. at 462.
National Football League v. PrimeTime24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000). The
converse position also applies; U.S. copyright law is breached by unlicensed transmissions
originating abroad that are received in the United States. See Los Angeles News Serv. v. Conus
Commc'ns Co., 969 F.Supp 579 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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abroad? Would it matter if many of the former "customers" of an
illegal service for which a defendant sought to substitute were also
located abroad? Would it be relevant if the advertisements that
supported defendants' business model were targeted only to U.S.
consumers?
On the facts of Grokster, these issues may seem moot. Even if
analysis of the factual matrix supporting the Grokster holding were
confined to purely domestic activity, there would almost certainly be
enough domestic infringing acts, in terms of the sheer volume of
primary infringers and targeted advertising, to make concern with the
foreign conduct largely, if not entirely, redundant. In the foreseeable
future, however, purveyors of software tools facilitating the creation
and maintenance of P2P networks may become more nimble, with
services targeted more sharply at niche markets, both in terms of
audience and content. 66 It is possible that numbers and geography
may begin to have greater significance.
As this section explains, the doctrine on extraterritorial
application of domestic intellectual property law is in a state of flux.
This section first surveys the law on extraterritorial application of
intellectual property rights. It then analyzes Justice Breyer's
concurring opinion in Grokster. In the light of the Sony decision,
Justice Breyer would constrain the liability theories available for
copyright proprietors, making for a more permissive environment for
technological development. As I explain below, Justice Breyer's
approach may impact other nations, nations that see the balance
between technological development and the rights of copyright
owners differently. I call this "de facto" exporting of Grokster.
A. De Jure Exporting of Intellectual Property Liability Theories
Indirect infringement in cases such as Grokster and Kazaa is
predicated on primary infringement by others. Many of those others
will be located abroad.67 To hold a defendant liable under U.S.
66. See, e.g., NewsfromRussia.com, Irish Software Designer to Create P2P Network
Secured from Official Monitoring, http://newsfromrussia.com/science/2005/08/01/60884.htm
(last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (reporting on announcement by software designer, Ian Clark, to
create a new P2P network that would include only invited, trusted users). It is also possible that
technology may re-impose territorial borders in the Internet context. See generally, JACK
GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS World
(2006).
67. "We do not presently have good cross-national data on file sharing." William S.
Bainbridge, Privacy and Property on the Net: Research Questions, 302 SCIENCE, 1686-87,
(Dec. 5, 2003). Disinterested statistics that analyze unauthorized uses of P2P networks by nation
are difficult to find. A 2005 "fact sheet" provided by IFPI reports rates of piracy in European
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copyright law for these infringements requires application of U.S.
copyright law to foreign conduct. The Supreme Court did not address
the issue of legislative jurisdiction,68 and we cannot assume that this
silence signals approval of the application of the inducement theory to
cases in which infringements occur beyond U.S. borders. However,
there is a significant body of recent case law that has considered the
territoriality principle in copyright law and other intellectual property
contexts. This case law suggests that there is considerable potential
within emerging doctrine to apply U.S. intellectual property laws to
foreign conduct.
jurisdictions at http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/press/20050412c.html. Zeropaid.com reports
that music download services that are apparently legitimate under Russian law sell files obtained
through P2P networks at http://www.zeropaid.com/news/articles/auto/ 1232004b.php.
Zdnetasia.com has recently reported on arrests of P2P users in Japan at
http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/ security/0,39044215,39159923,00.htm.
68. Although this article concerns substantive issues, it is important to note that
application of principles of personal jurisdiction often serve to "import" distant parties into the
local jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction issues were raised in the Grokster litigation in the
District Court. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F.Supp.2d 1073 (C.D.
Cal. 2003). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California did not consider there
to be a sufficient basis to exercise general jurisdiction. The reasoning was based on the
continuous stream of the defendants' commercial contacts with the forum, including the
conclusion of software and licensing contracts with millions of Californians, and its contacts
with advertising vendors and in-state legal and publicity agents were considered insufficient to
constitute the kind of "presence" required by general jurisdiction doctrine. See, e.g.,
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 413 (9th Cir. 1977). But the court found specific
jurisdiction to be presumptively reasonable, based on the quantum of commercial contacts with
the forum, evidenced by the two million Californian subscribers that had entered into limited
licenses controlling use of the defendants' software. The court also reasoned that the "effects
test" in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), would have provided an alternative basis for
personal jurisdiction. However, on this point the court distinguished between the plaintiff's
contributory and vicarious infringement claims, reasoning that the requirements of the effects
test were satisfied for the former but not the latter. Because vicarious liability, at least in the
copyright context, does not require an intent to infringe or knowledge of the direct infringement
(A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001)), the effects test would
not have been satisfied in Grokster. See Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 (applying Panavision
Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998), which requires: "(1) intentional
actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered-
and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered-in the forum state.") By contrast, the
plaintiffs contributory liability theory included an intentional act combined with knowledge that
Californian residents would be harmed, thus providing an alternative basis for personal
jurisdiction based on effects within the forum. The court accepted that "many, if not most,
music and video copyrights are owned by California-based companies." Grokster, 243 F. Supp.
2d at 1089.
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1. Copyright
First, it is necessary to consider decisional law suggesting that
there may be impediments to the application of U.S. copyright in
cases where the primary infringers are located beyond the forum. In
Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.,69 the Ninth
Circuit held en banc that the "authorization" tort did not constrain
authorization in the United States of actions in foreign territories,
regardless of whether the acts would have constituted infringements if
done within the United States. The Court of Appeals grounded its
analysis of the international issue in the territoriality of domestic
copyright law, 70 a concept that the Supreme Court had endorsed early
in the twentieth century. 71 The corollary of the Ninth Circuit's
endorsement of the territoriality of copyright law is that the lex
protectionis governs the primary infringement aspect of the
authorization tort,72 a principle that the Second Circuit has also
endorsed. 73
The Ninth Circuit did not rely solely on Supreme Court doctrine.
It also acknowledged the connection between territoriality and the
international copyright relations of the United States, reasoning that
extraterritorial application of the U.S. Copyright Act would cut across
the territorial premise of international copyright treaties.74 It
articulated that to accept that the U.S. Copyright Act could apply to
foreign activity would "disrupt Congress's efforts to secure a more
stable international intellectual property regime. '75  The court
observed "[e]xtraterritorial application of American law would be
contrary to the sprit of the Berne Convention, and might offend other
member nations by effectively displacing their law in circumstances
in which previously it was assumed to govern." 76 Here, the Ninth
69. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (en
banc).
70. Subafllms, 24 F.3d at 1095-99.
71. See United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S 260 (1908); Ferris v.
Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
72. For a meticulous exploration of the limits of the principle of lex protectionis in
copyright law, see MIRELLE VON EECHOUD, CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE LEXPROTECTIONIS (2003).
73. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
74. Subaflms, 24 F.3d at 1097-98.
75. Id. at 1097.
76. Id. To the extent the Ninth Circuit's observation that the national treatment principle
"implicates a rule of territoriality," and suggests that "national treatment" is, or dictates, a choice
of law rule, it probably goes too far. Id. That said, it may be more accurate to suggest that
territoriality is more logically consistent with the national treatment principle. National
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Circuit's analysis reflected what Professor Paul Berman has recently
described as "the idea that governments have an interest not only in
helping in-state litigants win the particular litigation at issue, but a
more important longer-term interest in being cooperative members of
an international system and sharing in its reciprocal benefits and
burdens. ' 77 As I have suggested elsewhere, 78 there is a further, and
related, normative component to the respect for the territorial integrity
of different nations' intellectual property policies: intellectual
property forms a part of many domestic policy agendas.
Extraterritorial application of intellectual property laws has the
potential to override domestic policy choices that may be important to
key aspects of domestic and social economic policy. 79
If doctrine developed in the "authorization" context is applicable
to secondary liability generally, this may lead to the conclusion that
Grokster's inducement principle should not be applied where the
primary infringements occurred outside the United States. Though
the lines between various forms of domestic infringement may be
blurry, a point recognized by the Sony Court,80 geopolitical lines are
not: the territoriality principle should preclude application of U.S.
liability theories where the primary acts of infringement occur abroad.
The Subafilms approach is not universally endorsed, however.8 1
Judge Wiseman of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
treatment provides that foreigners will be treated as well as nationals under each nation's
domestic copyright regime. If a national of country X could secure relief for copyright
infringement in country Y under the copyright laws of country X, which could then be enforced
in country Y, the need for a national treatment principle would significantly abate.
77. Paul Schiff Berman, Toward a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PAL. REV. 1819, 1822 (2005).
78. Graeme W. Austin, Valuing "Domestic Self-Determination" in International
Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155 (2002).
79. Id.
80. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n. 17
(1984): "the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability
are not clearly drawn .... quoting 480 F.Supp. 429, 457-58.
81. Phanesh Koneru, The Right "to Authorize" in U.S. Copyright Law: Questions of
Contributory Infringement And Extraterritoriality, 37 IDEA: THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY 87 (1996) (criticizing the 9th Circuit in Subafilms for inappropriately adopting the
requirement in contributory infringement that there be an infringing primary act). Professor
Timothy Holbrook argues that the Ninth Circuit misunderstood the nature of the authorization
tort, and finds support for this position in a statement made by the Sony Court that suggests
authorization tort and primary infringement to be on a par. Timothy Holbrook, Territoriality
Waning? Patent Infringment for Offering in the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2004). The Sony Court observed "an infringer is not merely one who
uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but also one who authorizes the use
of a copyrighted work without actual authority of the copyright owner." Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 n.
17. Holbrook argues that here the Supreme Court "implicitly suggested that, contrary to
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Tennessee made the following, well-known retort to Subafilms,
reasoning that authorization does not require a domestic act of
primary infringement:
[P]iracy has changed since the Barbary days. Today, the raider
need not grab the bounty with his own hands; he need only
transmit his go-ahead by wire or telefax to start the presses in a
distant land. Subafilms ignores this economic reality, and the
economic incentives underpinning the Copyright Clause designed
to encourage creation of new works, and transforms infringement
of the authorization right into a requirement of domestic presence
by a primary infringer. Under this view, a phone call to Nebraska
results in liability; the same phone call to France results in riches.
In a global marketplace, it is literally a distinction without a
difference. 82
A district court in New Jersey adopted a similar approach,
reasoning that Judge Wiseman's analysis was more sensitive to the
"modem age of telefaxes, Internet communication, and electronic
mail systems. ' 83 The New Jersey court saw the authorization tort as
preventing infringement of copyright by an entity "merely directing
its foreign agent to do its dirty work. '' 84 As Professor Holbrook has
noted, these two district court cases possibly portend a circuit split on
the territorial reach of the authorization tort. 85
Subafilms is now over a decade old, and its analysis arose from a
completely different context than P2P networks. It also predates the
massive threats to copyright owners' interests posed by digitization
and the Internet, as did the Supreme Court cases on which the Ninth
Circuit drew. One can sense in the district courts' analysis some
frustration about domestic copyright owners' vulnerability to foreign
piracy that might be exacerbated by strict insistence on territoriality.
Courts in the leading copyright circuits distinguish Subafilms where a
Subafilms, authorization is an independent form of direct infringement." Holbrook,
Territoriality Waning, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. at 744 (emphasis added). Thus, "an act of
authorization domestically is copyright infringement within the United States, and the location
of the authorized act should be irrelevant to the inquiry." All the authorization tort requires,
Holbrook concludes, is that the primary infringement would have been infringing had it been
committed within the United States. Id. We should be careful, however, not to read too much
into the analysis of the Sony Court that Professor Holbrook invokes. The Court's analysis was
not directed to the issue before the Ninth Circuit in Subafilms, and did not consider what the
content of the authorization tort might be, let alone the issue of its extraterritorial application.
82. Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
83. Expediters Int'l of Washington, Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Management Services, Inc.,
995 F. Supp. 468, 477 (D.N.J. 1998).
84. Id.
85. Holbrook, supra note 81, at 745.
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predicate act of infringement occurring within the United States
facilitates infringement abroad. 86 Rightly or wrongly, the predicate
act theory has the potential to be quite protective of domestic
copyright owners' interests in foreign territories, even in cases in
which liability under the copyright laws of the relevant foreign
state(s) has not been established. 87 Moreover, because temporary
digital storage is considered a legally cognizable copy in U.S.
copyright law, the predicate act theory has the potential to catch a
significant amount of foreign copying. 88 Because P2P networks are
not geographically segregated, we might expect temporary copies of
files to "pass through" local "nodes" quite often. If a liability theory
can "catch" an unauthorized copy that occurs in the United States,
then it would seem to be consistent with the predicate act theory for it
too provides pecuniary relief for all the further foreign infringements
that the "local" copy facilitates.
Without definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, lower
courts' willingness to apply Grokster in cases that involve foreign
conduct, and in which litigants have put the geographical scope of
liability at issue, will likely depend on how rigidly future courts view
the territoriality principle. Arguably, application of the predicate act
theory will very often be an affront to a strict understanding of the
territorial premise of the international copyright treaty regime, as
much as extraterritorial application of the "authorization" tort.89
Further extension of the theory may be even more so.90 With this in
mind, one should also question whether it is always contrary to the
spirit of the Berne Convention to adapt liability theories to stem the
tide of massive copyright infringement over international
communications networks. However, before considering that
question, it may be helpful first to consider the rapidly evolving
doctrine on the territorial reach of U.S. patent and trademark laws. In
these contexts also, the territoriality principle is becoming
increasingly fluid.
86. See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Television Intern., Ltd., 149 F.3d 987
(9th Cir. 2005).
87. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939).
88. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private International Law of Copyright, 273 RECEUIL DES
COORS 240, 345 (1998) [hereinafter, Ginsburg, Private International Law of Copyright].
89. See Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in
Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 Colum.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 1 (1999)
[hereinafter, Austin, Domestic Laws].
90. Ginsburg, supra note 88, at 347.
2006] IMPORTING KAZAA - EXPORTING GROKSTER 599
2. Patents
The Grokster Court's adoption of inducement liability from
patent law makes it appropriate to examine the experience in cross-
border application of principles of patent liability to assist in
understanding the potential for extraterritorial application of the
Grokster theory. A key difference between copyright and patent
liability is that the patent statute is generally explicit about its
application to foreign conduct, whereas the Copyright Act is largely
silent on the issue. Patents may be the most "explicitly territorial" 91
of intellectual property rights, but Congress has also made a number
of important amendments delineating the extraterritorial scope of
statutory infringement principles. 92 For example, in response 93 to the
Supreme Court's Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. decision,
Congress enacted § 271(f) of the Patent Act, which imposes liability
for foreign assembly of components of patented inventions where the
defendant has supplied or caused to be supplied in or from the United
States all or a substantial portion of the components of an invention.94
This subsection recently prompted the Federal Circuit to observe that
"Congress obviously intended the statue to have an extraterritorial
effect." 95
As Professor Holbrook has discussed exhaustively, the Patent
Act specifies several aspects of its territorial reach in detail, but it is
also silent on the territorial reach of some of the other specific
infringements delineated in § 271, a number of which litigants may
91. Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property:
Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 605 (1997). The territorial scope of U.S.
patent laws has been affirmed in a number of Supreme Court decisions. See Boesch v. Graff,
133 U.S. 697 (1890) (German prior use provisions no defense to infringement of U.S. patent
rights); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641 (1915) (foreign sales
of patented product do not infringe U.S. patent rights); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,
406 U.S. 518 (1972) (foreign assembly of domestically manufactured components of patented
product did not infringe U.S. patent rights). The strict approach to territoriality of patent law
was also reflected in the traditional reluctance of U.S. domestic courts to hear claims involving
allegations of infringements of foreign patent rights. See Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon
Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the court had neither supplemental nor
original jurisdiction over infringement of a Japanese patent).
92. The Patent Act contains prohibitions against importation of patented inventions. See,
e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Importation is, however, generally a matter of domestic territoriality,
and is primarily concerned with what occurs within the United States.
93. See John R. Thomas, New Challenges for the Law of Patents, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 165, 180 (Charles E. F. Rickett &
Graeme W. Austin eds., 2000).
94. Deepsouth Packing, 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
95. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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invoke in cases involving foreign infringements. 96 Most significant
for present purposes is the congressional silence on the territorial
reach of the section codifying the tort of "inducement" of patent
infringement. 97 It provides simply "Whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."98 Moreover, §
271 creates liability for "offering to sell" a patented invention, but
does not state that the contemplated sale must occur within the United
States. Professor Holbrook suggested that liability for offers to sell
should not be confined within territorial confines, and that a flexible
approach should be adopted that allows liability to be imposed in
cases where the contemplated sale occurs abroad. 99
The Federal Circuit has recently seemed quite willing to apply
the U.S. Patent Act in ways that expand its reach into foreign
territories. In AT&T v. Microsoft, in the course of a patent
infringement action brought by AT&T, Microsoft sought to exclude
evidence of alleged liability under § 271 (f) arising out of foreign sales
of products whose components AT&T claimed included copies of its
patented software. 100 Microsoft argued that the prohibition in §
271(f) against foreign assembly of components supplied from the
United States did not apply where one copy of a patented software
program was supplied to foreign manufactures, even if the supply
facilitated the making of further copies. Microsoft claimed that the
section requires the individual components themselves to be supplied
96. Holbrook, supra note 81, at 723.
97. In late August of 2005, in MEMC v. Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials
Silicon Corp, No. 04-1396-1513, slip op. at 17 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 22, 2005), the Federal Circuit
declined to consider the issue of the extraterritorial reach of inducement of patent infringement.
98. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000).
99. Holbrook, supra note 81, at 750.
100. AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d 1366. Another recent case in which the Federal Circuit has
adopted (somewhat equivocally) an expansive approach to territoriality is NTP, Inc. v. Research
in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005) opinion withdrawn and replaced by, 418 F.3d
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006). In its initial opinion, the Federal
Circuit held that U.S. patent law applied to an allegation of infringement under 35 U.S.C. §
271(a) where "control and beneficial use" of a patented combination occurs within the United
States, even where a component of that combination is physically located abroad. Rethinking its
original analysis, the court in a revised opinion held that a process cannot be used within the
United States, as is required by § 271 (a), unless each step of the process is performed within this
country. Nevertheless, the court confirmed that, with respect to the system claim, use of an
invention occurs where the system as a whole is put into place, and that jurisdiction was proper
because "use of the communication system as a whole occur[ed] in the United States." 418 F.3d
at 1317.
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from the United States. 101 Declining to permit Microsoft to exploit
this apparent loophole, the Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
reasoning that to hold otherwise would thwart the remedial purpose of
§ 271(f), which was to provide for more robust protections for U.S.
patent holders in the global context. 10 2
Where software is a major component of the invention, the
approach of the Federal Circuit has significant potential to cut across
foreign patent regimes and policies, perhaps even more than the
predicate act doctrine in copyright law. Under § 271(f), where the
foreign creation of software components is facilitated by the supply of
an unauthorized domestic copy of the software program, the Federal
Circuit's approach in AT&T may achieve substantially the same
outcome. 103 However, there is probably a greater international
consensus that computer programs are to be protected under copyright
law than exists in the patent context. 104 Thus, the predicate act theory,
at least for literal copying of computer programs, may be expected to
generate fewer genuine conflicts between different domestic regimes
due to its indifference to the content of foreign laws. Within the scope
of § 271 (f), the Federal Circuit has put the extraterritorial reach of
patent rights, the "most explicitly territorial" of intellectual property
rights, on a foundation that is at least as secure, if not more so, as the
doctrine providing for extraterritorial application of U.S. copyright
law. 10 5
The majority in AT&T was apparently unconcerned by the
prospect of tension between the U.S. and foreign patent regimes.
101. AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1369. In Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399
F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal Circuit a few months earlier confirmed that software can
be a "component" of an invention, for the purposes of § 271 (f).
102. 1d. at 1371. As the Federal Circuit noted, by overturning Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), § 271(f) was intended to ensure that defendants would not
escape liability for manufacturing components of patented inventions in the United States, and
then shipping them abroad. In effect, § 271(f) ensures that the scope of a domestic patent
includes control over domestic manufacture of the components of an invention intended for
foreign assembly and sale. With AT&T v. Microsoft, 414 F.3d 1366, the Federal Circuit appears
to expand on this policy and now allows § 271(f) to control foreign assembly in some
circumstances, even where no domestic manufacture is needed.
103. Although patent damages may in some circumstances be higher. 35 U.S.C. § 284
(providing for the court to award three times the compensatory damages sum).
104. The TRIPs Agreement creates an international obligation to provide copyright
protection for computer programs. See TRIPs Agreement, art. 10 (requiring members of the
World Trade Organization protect software as literary works under the Berne Convention).
105. Between the Ninth and Second Circuits, there exists disagreement on the kind and
extent of pecuniary relief that can be provided to copyright plaintiffs. Compare Update Art, Inc.
v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988) with Los Angeles News Service v.
Reuters Television Int'l Ltd., 340 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Inscrutably, the majority observed that "obtaining foreign patents
would surely alleviate some avoidance of American law," but
confirmed that the court "must construe our statute irrespective of the
existence or nonexistence of foreign patents."' 106 The majority's
indifference with respect to the international arena provoked a stern
dissent from Judge Rader, 107 who considered that the majority had
wrongly conflated the distinct acts of "supplying" and "copying."' 108
On the international issue, Judge Rader reasoned, "Thus, this Court
provides extraterritorial expansion of U.S. law by punishing under
U.S. law 'copying' that occurs abroad. While copying in Dusseldorf
or Tokyo may indeed constitute infringement, that infringement must
find its remedy under German or Japanese law."' 109
3. Trademarks
Of the major intellectual property rights, trademark rights have
long been the most susceptible to extraterritorial application."l 0 The
1952 Supreme Court decision in Steele v. Bulova confirmed that the
Lanham Act can apply to trademark infringements occurring in
foreign territories, 111 in a case involving the a U.S. resident
defendant's marketing of "Bulova" branded watches in Mexico. The
defendant had been the first to register the mark in Mexico, but by the
date of the Supreme Court's decision, that registration had been
annulled in separate Mexican judicial proceedings. Arguably, this
meant that the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act
presented less of an affront to the foreign trademark laws and the
decisions of the foreign trademark officials who had registered the
defendant's trademark. The Fifth Circuit, however, would have
allowed the case to proceed, even where imposition of liability under
U.S. trademark law could have conflicted with rights granted by a
106. AT&T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1370 n.2.
107. Id. at 1372. There was an opportunity for Judge Rader to address the limits of the
territorial reach of § 271(f) in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), which was decided by the Federal Circuit earlier in 2005. Though Judge Rader
authored the earlier opinion, he did not explore the extraterritoriality issues implicated by Eolas
Technologies. See Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1338-40 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
108. For a case appearing to segregate supply and copying in the international copyright
context, see Psihoyos v. Liberation Inc., No. 96 Civ. 3609 (LMM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5777
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 1997).
109. AT&TCorp.,414F.3d at 1373.
110. See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism,
37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 527 (1997).
111. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
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foreign sovereign."l 2 The Fifth Circuit would apparently not have
accepted Judge Rader's analysis in the patent context in AT&T, and
appeared largely unconcerned with whether the "infringement must
find its remedy" under Mexican law.
Other circuits have varied responses to the application of the
Lanham Act in cases of alleged infringement of trademark rights in
foreign territories. In Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co.,1 13 the Second
Circuit emphasized that before the Lanham Act applies to
infringements in foreign territories, there must be a substantial effect
on U.S. commerce the defendant should be a U.S. citizen and there
should be consideration of the degree of conflict with foreign laws.ll 4
The Second Circuit's test in Vanity Fair has been diluted in other
circuits, a trend that continues in very recent case law.11 5 The Ninth
Circuit requires only that there be "some" effect on United States
commerce, rather than the more demanding "substantial" effects, and
generally applies a more flexible "rule of reason" approach, 116 which
it borrowed from cases concerned with the extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust laws. 117 The First Circuit recently declined to follow
the Second Circuit, and has also rejected the Ninth Circuit's "some
112. Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1952).
113. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956).
114. While the Second Circuit has subsequently counseled against an "unrefined"
application of these factors, (See Sterling Drug v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 746 (2d Cir. 1994)),
its "factored" approach is generally consistent with the view that courts should be cautious about
applying U.S. trademark law to foreign conduct.
115. There is also evidence of flexibility in the opposite direction. Courts have been
willing to provide relief under the Lanham Act to a foreign firm based on very little commercial
activity within the United States. In International Bancorp, LLC v. Society des Bains de Mer,
329 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1052 (2004), the Fourth Circuit granted
relief to a foreign owner of the "Casino Monte Carlo" mark against a defendant who had
registered various domain names for websites offering gambling services that incorporated the
mark or variations of it. The plaintiff had registered the mark in Monaco, but not in the United
States, and it did not carry on gambling services within the United States. However, the plaintiff
operated a travel bureau in New York. Based on these facts, and the defendant's deliberate
copying of the plaintiff's mark, the Fourth Circuit held, over a strenuous dissent by Judge Motz,
that the Lanham Act protected the plaintiffs rights in the Monte Carlo mark.
116. See Wells Fargo v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 428-29 (9th Cir. 1977);
Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1985).
117. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993), the Supreme Court adopted a more restrictive approach to balancing where defendants
exhibited an express purpose to affect U.S. commerce and the foreign conduct was not required
by the foreign sovereign. On the issue of conflict with foreign trademark regimes, the Ninth
Circuit now considers a range of factors, including the degree of conflict with foreign laws or
policies, the nationalities of the parties and the location of their principal places of business, the
significance of the harm to U.S. commerce relative to foreign harms, and the relative importance
of the trademark violations in the United States.
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effects" test.1 18 Under the First Circuit's analysis, international
comity can be a prudential concern, but it cannot delimit the scope of
United States trademark law. 119 In general, this flexibility has
increased the opportunities for U.S. trademark law to be applied to
conduct occurring in foreign territories.120
In sum, in all three major branches of intellectual property the
concept of territoriality is becoming increasingly flexible. In
copyright, Subafilms has not won unwavering endorsement within
other circuits, and there are other doctrinal bases to expand the
extraterritorial reach of all of the major branches of U.S. intellectual
property law. At the doctrinal level, it cannot now be claimed that the
territoriality principle stands as a firm bulwark against the
extraterritorial application of U.S. intellectual property laws.
Moreover, in other areas of commercial law there are a number of
other theories that might support more flexible approaches to
territoriality. United States law might apply, for instance where the
foreign conduct has a sufficiently significant connection with the
United States, 121 where there are sufficiently significant effects on
United States commerce, 122 and where the balancing of relevant
"factors," including foreign sovereignty interests, comes down in
118. In McBee v. Delica, 417 F.3d 107 (2005), the First Circuit reasoned that once a
substantial effect on U.S. commerce is established, that is sufficient to show that the United
States has a "reasonably strong interest" in the litigation, and it is not necessary to consider
issues of international comity in order to establish whether the jurisdiction of the Lanham Act
reaches foreign conduct.
119. Id. at 111. (On the facts, the court held that no liability existed for unauthorized use of
a U.S.-based musician's name for a clothing line marketed almost exclusively in Japan.).
120. The Ninth Circuit has also evinced flexibility in the application of the Lanham Act to
trademark rights first established abroad where the trademark is considered "famous" in the
United States. In Grupo Gigante v. Dallo, 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004). in the first federal
court of appeals decision to recognize the "famous marks" doctrine, the Ninth Circuit held that a
foreign firm could establish U.S. trademark rights, and priority against a mark used in commerce
within the United States, based on foreign use in commerce, if a "substantial percentage of
consumers in the relevant American market is familiar with the foreign mark." Id. at 1098.
Grupo Gigante does not indicate a complete rejection of the territoriality principle in trademark
law. The "substantial percentage" standard is higher than would be required to establish priority
in a purely domestic dispute, which the Ninth Circuit suggested was necessary to maintain the
integrity of the territoriality principle. Nevertheless, Grupo Gigante does indicate that courts
regard the territoriality of trademarks as a flexible principle, one they can adapt to new demands
of international commerce.
121. See, e.g., Psiemenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The
conduct test ... center[s] its inquiry on ... the nature of conduct within the United States as it
relates to carrying out the alleged fraudulent scheme.").
122. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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favor of extraterritorial application of U.S. law, 123  and the
identification by the fact finder of an "express purpose" by the
defendant to affect U.S. commerce. 124
The cases discussed in this section all involve issues of "dejure"
applications of U.S. intellectual property law, applications that
directly confront the territoriality of domestic laws. In the networked
environment, however, domestic laws do not necessarily have to be
deliberately applied to foreign conduct to have effects in other
jurisdictions. Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Grokster, which
is discussed in the following section, helps illustrate this point.
B. De Facto Export of Liability Theories
Justice Breyer, and the justices who joined his opinion, Justices
O'Connor and Stevens, would have upheld the granting of summary
judgment based on the Sony test in favor of the Grokster defendants.
As is well known, Sony provides a "safe harbor" for those who,
without more, market products that are capable of uses that infringe
copyrights as well as substantial non-infringing uses. Justice Breyer
and Justice Ginsburg, who authored the other concurring opinion,
disagreed as to the evidence required to establish whether a product
complied with the Sony standard for purposes of summary judgment.
They also disagreed about how to characterize the volume of non-
infringing uses that the Sony safe harbor requires, a question that the
Sony Court did not directly address. Justice Breyer suggested that a
product would fall outside of the Sony standard if it "will be used
almost exclusively to infringe copyrights."' 125 Justice Ginsburg and
the two justices who joined her opinion, the Chief Justice and Justice
Kennedy, cited cases indicating that lower courts have required
"substantial" and "predominant" non-infringing uses to enable a
defendant to qualify. 126 On this view, the relative amounts of
infringing and non-infringing conduct may be more important for the
application of the Sony standard.
123. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). As
was discussed supra note 117, the Ninth Circuit has continued to adopt this test, notwithstanding
the more restrictive approach to "balancing" delineated in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764 (1993).
124. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). But compare F. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (declining to apply U.S. antitrust law to
activity in foreign territories).
125. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
126. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2791 (2005).
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Justice Breyer's opinion emphasizes the "balancing" implicit in
the Sony test, between facilitating the development of new technology
and providing meaningful protection of the rights of copyright
owner's rights. He argued that the Sony standard "seeks to protect not
only the Groksters of this world.. .but the development of technology
more generally."' 127 He concluded that if there is a choice between
protecting copyrights and facilitating technological development, the
law "leans in favor of protecting technology."'128 In support of this
conclusion, Justice Breyer pointed to the ability to bring copyright
infringement actions against individual infringers, and technological
tools-such as digital watermarking and encryption-that copyright
owners can use to prevent further illicit copying.
Others will debate whether the balance struck in Justice Breyer's
analysis between, technology and copyright is sensible, and whether it
finds support in U.S. copyright law. 129 But if we consider this
reasoning in light of international relationships between different
nations' cop3right laws, this reasoning betrays both an insular
conception of the problems of cross-border infringement of digital
material, and a unilateralist imposition on other jurisdictions of a
localized vision of the appropriate balance between technological
development and copyright protection. Most significantly, Justice
Breyer's analysis leaves little room for the possibility that other
nations might see the balance differently. Given the ease with which
digital files cross international borders and can interfere with foreign
markets for copyright protected materials, perhaps one unforeseen
corollary of "technology-friendly" policies developed in the U.S. may
be their "export" into foreign copyright systems, accompanied by the
risk of upsetting whatever balance other nations' copyright regimes
have established. Different nations and regions are in the process of
developing legal and economic policies to respond to the problem of
P2P networks, policies that will be formulated against the
fundamental question Justice Breyer identified of whether "gains on
the copyright swings would exceed the losses on the technology
roundabouts." 130 It is not clear that all, or even most, would resolve
127. Id. at 2784.
128. Id. at 2790.
129. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Nouvelles des Etats-Unis: Responsabilitd pour complicitd de
contrefaqon. La ddcision de la Cour Supreme du 27juin 2005 dans I 'affaire MGM v. Grokster,
11 Auteurs & M6dias 290 (2005) (suggesting that Justice Breyer's assertion that copyright law
favors technology is warranted by neither the Copyright Act of 1976 nor the Copyright Clause
in the federal Constitution).
130. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2793.
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the uncertainties by adopting a policy that "leans in favor of
protecting technology."' 131 Some might favor protecting copyright
more.
132
Justice Breyer's analysis betrays a conventional understanding of
the role of the author in copyright law. Most obviously, his analysis
does not focus on authors at all; 133 his balancing analysis pitches the
developers of technology against the revenue interests of copyright
owners. And, as between copyright owners and those who develop
new technologies "in the garage, the dorm room, the corporate lab, or
the boardroom,"' 134 copyright owners are to take second place. By
imposing the costs of technological self-help on copyright owners,
risks entrenching traditional relationships between individual authors
and publishers. Those who seek to protect copyrights will likely be
forced to use ever stronger technological protections against P2P
products and services developed in the nations' board- and dorm-
rooms, and authors may be driven back into relationships with firms
that can provide those kinds of services. Because few individual
authors are likely to have the required technological expertise, some
relationships between authors and those purveying technological
protection services are likely to endure.135 But the doctrine developed
by Justice Breyer would intensify the need for authors to seek out
firms providing such services and enter into licensing arrangements
with them, which may make it even more difficult for authors to
independently market their works independently. Justice Breyer's
approach also risks exacerbating the problem of the development of a
technological arms race, forcing authors to be increasingly vigilant
131. Id.
132. Critiquing this point, Professor Peter Yu has suggested that Justice Breyer's approach,
which would allow for the free(er) circulation of digital copies of copyright protected works in
foreign territories, may be beneficial to many foreign nations in which the "balance of payment"
for entertainment products favors the United States. Peter Yu, Remarks at the Santa Clara
University Law School Conference on Secondary Liability in Intellectual Property Law (Oct. 7,
2005). That said, however, the development of international intellectual property policy should
also take into account the ability of foreign markets for intellectual property to develop. In
particular, musical works for which production costs are low, relative to other types of
intellectual property products, the availability of free foreign works may be particularly
detrimental to the development and flourishing of domestic markets, which, in turn, may lead to
more favorable balances of trade. See further Graham Gori, In Mexico Pirated Music Outsells
the Legal Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002, at C5 (discussing the effects on domestic music
markets of pirated music).
133. l am grateful to Professor Jane Ginsburg for this observation.
134. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2793.
135. Yu, supra note 132, (expressing skepticism about authors' ability to develop
technological marketing platforms for themselves).
608 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 22
about wrapping the works they market in ever stronger technological
protections. 136
Justice Breyer's opinion underscores the problem that a liability
standard that favors technological development over the rights of
copyright owners risks de facto export of these domestic policies. 137
That is, if the Sony "safe harbor" is capacious, we could expect more
copyright protected works to be "shared" without compensating
copyright owners. Furthermore, we could also expect those copies to
circulate in foreign jurisdictions, including those that adopt more
copyright-protective policies, or which, for example, are more
concerned with ensuring an author's ability to forge more direct
relationships with the public, without the need to search for firms that
market the highest-end technological protections.
Justice Breyer's policy analysis is insular, as it concerns only the
appropriate balance for the United States at this particular stage of
technological development. Furthermore, the analysis is unilateral
because it risks imposing its policy balance on the rest of the world
and conflicts with the dominant international consensus that is
reflected in the Berne Convention and other public international law
instruments: that domestic legal systems are to provide meaningful
protection of copyrights. Justice Breyer provides no indication in his
opinion that the Sony balance was an appropriate policy choice for
any nation other than the United States, but neither does he identify
what the international effects of such a policy balance might be.
IV. TOWARD A PRINCIPLED DEPARTURE FROM TERRITORIALITY IN
THE P2P CONTEXT
Equally of course, dejure application of domestic copyright law
to conduct in foreign territories adopts a unilateral approach to
international copyright relations. For example, the Australian
approach to unlicensed communication of copyright protection works
cuts across the territoriality. In addition, if the liability standard
articulated in Grokster is indifferent to the place of the primary
136. The recent announcement of the formation of "Motion Picture Laboratories," a non-
profit consortium devoted to studying and developing technological measures to thwart on-line
piracy of motion pictures provides a small insight into the money involved. Funded by major
motion picture studios, it will have a budget of $30 million for the first two years of its
operation. David M. Halbfinger, Hollywood Studios Unite in Piracy Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2005, at C5.
137. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules
Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 223 (2004) (discussing how low protection
rules in one jurisdiction can undermine the force of higher protections in other jurisdictions).
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infringement, it would also seem to have the potential to create
significant tension with the basic territorial premise. A strict
territorialist might insist that analysis of the Grokster liability
standard, and the conditions for its application, should take into
account the location of the various actions constituting infringement,
both direct and indirect infringement.
Under this analysis, it should matter where the primary acts of
infringement take place, where the advertising touting the infringing
uses is directed, and most importantly, whether the direct acts of
infringement are unlawful in the place where the users of the P2P
products and services are located. These issues may also be relevant
for the Sony safe harbor, depending on which version applies: 138 if
numbers of infringing uses as compared with non-infringing uses are
critical to a finding of substantial non-infringing uses, it could matter
where the users of the P2P products and services are located.
A. Contesting Territoriality in the P2P Context
Cross-border copyright issues involving P2P products and
services put new pressure on the territoriality principle, a principle
that the survey above suggests is rendered increasingly contestable in
U.S. intellectual property jurisprudence. It has long been recognized
that the territoriality principle was put under unprecedented pressures
by the Internet, but the kinds of liability theories that are being
developed in the P2P context create new difficulties that do not
simply arise from the increased international availability of infringing
copyright protected works. The Grokster and Kazaa cases sublimate
the international issues that have provoked searching analysis by U.S.
courts in other transnational intellectual property cases, 139 and in
other commercial contexts in which U.S. law has applied to foreign
conduct.14 0
Liability for direct infringement of copyright is based on a
relationship between the indirect and the direct defendants, a
relationship that is now inherently international in character. Indirect
liability, whether based on authorization or inducement, is founded on
construction of the defendants' mental state with respect to both their
138. See supra Part III.
139. See supra Part III.A.
140. In other contexts of U.S. jurisprudence there is a long pedigree of case law focusing
sharply on the bases and justifications for the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law, most notably in
the antitrust context, but also in cases involving foreign securities fraud. See generally
Buxbaum, supra note 14.
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own actions in the development of business plans, advertising
strategies, and the like, as well as with respect to the actions of
primary infringers located everywhere the Internet can reach. Where
the liability theory itself depends on defendants' communication of
signals, express or implied, to P2P users everywhere, strict adherence
to the territoriality principle seems artificial. If domestic courts really
need to concern themselves with exactly where the primary acts of
infringement occurred (or are likely to occur) the territoriality
principle might impose significant impediments to a viable domestic
copyright scheme that can respond to massive amounts of copyright
infringement facilitated by technologies that link primary infringers in
every nation where there is Internet access. Grokster and Kazaa
present the antithesis of the kind of fact pattern that preoccupied the
Supreme Court recently in F. Hoffinann LaRoche v. Empagran, a case
where plaintiffs urged the Court to mandate application of U.S.
antitrust law to foreign conduct. 141 The case was premised on an
assumption that the commercial activity in the relevant markets was
independent of the effects on United States commerce. 142 In contrast,
it is hard to imagine a case in which domestic and foreign effects are
more intertwined than cases involving P2P products and services in
which no geographical or other filtering devices have been applied by
the designers.
Professor Holbrook suggested that the territorial view of
intellectual property "seem[s] ever more antiquated with every
passing year." 143 Building on work by Professor Graeme Dinwoodie,
he proposed a substitute for the territoriality principle that would have
judges in individual cases developing substantive norms in individual
cases that meld public international policies with courts' perception of
the relevant domestic intellectual property policies of the nations
involved in the litigation. 144 Under this approach, substantive
outcomes might not resemble any that might be dictated by the
domestic laws that could be applied under conventional private
international law principles. Dinwoodie and Holbrook have
141. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), applying the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a).
142. The D.C. Circuit confirmed this assumption on remand. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v.
Empagran, S.A., 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that, for the purpose of 15 U.S.C. §
6(a), the foreign conduct was not sufficiently connected with the effects on the U.S. market
caused by the defendants' conduct).
143. Holbrook, supra note 81, at 758.
144. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 469 (2000).
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acknowledged that their approach would initially create considerable
uncertainty, at least for a time, while courts in major intellectual
property jurisdictions more fully develop adequate principles and
tests. 145 Elsewhere, I have questioned whether this is an appropriate
judicial task, and whether it is really feasible to identify intellectual
property policies divorced from broader societal concerns in diverse
areas such as technological development, education and literacy,
agriculture, and so on. 146 Moreover, as Dinwoodie and Holbrook
acknowledge, the principles that might be applied by courts adopting
the substantive law approach to conflict of laws questions might
resemble neither the substantive copyright laws of the domestic
nations involved, nor any public international law principles. 147 To
have judges override both domestic and international laws is
extremely difficult to justify. I do believe, however, that it is
important to consider the principles that might inform the
development of alternatives to territoriality, particularly in a
technological environment where the territoriality principle is
increasingly in flux, and where insisting on its integrity in all contexts
seems increasingly unreal.
Other scholars have advanced alternatives to territoriality, but
the reasons offered in support of their adoption often seem thin. For
example, it is true that the EU Satellite Directive adopts the law of the
place of upload as the governing law for satellite transmissions, but
this provides little normative basis for adoption of this approach in
either broader geopolitical contexts or for different kinds of
technologies. 148 Similarly, some scholars have suggested adopting a
"cascade" approach to cross-border infringement, positing a number
of different laws that might be adopted if the initial choices are infirm
to enforce the copyright. 149 However, a significant problem with
cascade approaches is that, without more, they can appear to be
motivated primarily by enforcement. Cascade approaches typically do
not engage with the risks of overriding the social policy choices that
145. Holbrook, supra note 81, at 757; Dinwoodie, supra note 144, at 480.
146. Austin, supra note 78, at 1190.
147. Holbrook, supra note 81, at 758; Dinwoodie, supra note 144, at 554.
148. Council Directive 93/83/EEC of Sept. 27, 1993, O.J.E.C. L 248/15, preamble 14, art.
1.2(b) (law of the country of uplink applies to determine liability for unauthorized public
performance by means of satellite transmissions). See Ginsburg, Private International Law of
Copyright, supra note 88, at 325-26.
149. See generally Andreas P. Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts
on Global Networks, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 799 (1994) (discussing a variety of different
approaches to choice of law for copyright infringement).
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are reflected in different nations' intellectual property laws, in the
event that the chosen law is not also the lexprotectionis.
P2P products and services distill a paradox: practical steps to
enforce the rights of copyright owners under domestic law will almost
inevitably lead to application in foreign territories of the applicable
law, something that is most pertinently demonstrated by the silence of
both the Grokster and the Kazaa courts on the international reach of
their holdings. On the other hand, as the discussion above of Justice
Breyer's Grokster concurrence attempts to demonstrate, under-
enforcement of copyright is very likely to have significant effects on
other nations' copyright regimes. Faced with this paradox, the best
we can probably do is to work toward identifying common values that
may assist in guiding tribunals and legislatures that must contend with
the interrelationship between different legal systems in the
international copyright context. 150
As the 2000 amendments to the Australian Copyright Act (1968)
and the U.S. case law on the extraterritorial reach of intellectual
property laws demonstrate, lawmakers appear to be quite prepared to
craft liability theories in the intellectual property context that have
extraterritorial effects. We should be concerned, however, with how
departure from the territoriality principle is justified. Extraterritorial
assertions of domestic law have been traditionally regarded as
exceptions to the primary rule that a nation's laws are confined to its
own territory. These exceptions require justifications that make sense
both domestically and internationally.151
B. Public International Law in Domestic Conflict ofLaws
In a technological and legal context where legal standards
developed in one nation can easily affect policies developed in others,
it is appropriate to look to public international norms for guiding
principles. The idea that public international law principles should
influence the development of domestic law, particularly where one
nation's acts affect others, has a long legal pedigree, and in the
copyright context, reflects a broad consensus among many 152 nations
150. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 74-77 (1994). See also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Norms, 46 VA. J,
INT'L L. (forthcoming 2006) in which Professor Buxbaum presents a comprehensive analysis of
this issue in the context of cross-border enforcement of regulatory statutes, in contexts such as
anti-trust, RICO, and foreign security fraud.
151. HIGGENS, supra note 150, at 77.
152. Perhaps not all: Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright
Convention Must Be Repealed, 40 HouS. L. REV. 763, 764 (2003).
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about appropriate legal ordering for copyright matters. 153 For
copyright issues, an obvious source for principles is the Berne
Convention. In most cases, adherence to the territoriality principle is
consistent with dominant international norms reflected in the
Convention. The Ninth Circuit's emphasis in Subafilms on the role of
international obligations in the shaping of domestic doctrine is
consistent with the underlying national treatment premise of the
international copyright regime: each nation's laws should govern
issues of infringement for the places where the infringing activity
interferes with the market that is created by each nation's copyright
laws. 154 The territoriality principle is also consistent with normative
principles that require accountability to the citizenship that is required
to bear the costs of intellectual property enforcement. The Subafilms
approach is more than "invocation of sovereignty for its own sake," to
adopt Professor Rosalyn Higgins' phrase. 155 Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit's approach reflects the principle that public international law
obligations have a role in shaping domestic doctrine. 156 The Supreme
Court recently emphasized the importance of "prescriptive comity" in
the antitrust context, 157 and recent copyright jurisprudence 158
153. See generally, Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as Canon of
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990) (discussing the relevance of
public international law obligations to the development of domestic law). Professors Jane
Ginsburg and Sam Ricketson have recently argued that the requirement in art. I of the Universal
Copyright Convention (943 U.N.T.S. 178) that parties provide authors with "adequate and
effective protection of their rights" might oblige parties to include appropriate contributory
liability principles). Jane C. Ginsburg & Sam Ricketson, Inducers and Authorisers: A
Comparison of the US Supreme Court's Grokster Decision and the Australian Federal Court's
Kazaa Ruling, 11 Media and Arts Law Review (forthcoming 2006), available at
http://papers.ssm.cornsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=888928. While I am generally sympathetic
to Professors Ginsburg and Ricketson's project, my concern here is with the influence of public
international law obligations on judge-made domestic law, rather than public international law
obligations imposed on domestic governments.
154. See also Hans Ullrich, TRIPs: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate
Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 153, 160 (1995) (arguing that extraterritorial
application of domestic intellectual property law distorts competition).
155. HIGGINS, supra note 150, at 77.
156. See generally, Steinhardt, supra note 153, but see Edward Lee, The New Canon:
Using or Misusing Foreign Law to Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1 (2005).
157. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004): "...if
America's antitrust policies could not win their own way in the international marketplace for
such ideas, Congress, we must assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal
imperialism, through legislative fiat."
158. See Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(international bargaining leverage secured by membership of the Berne Convention achieved by
copyright legislation relevant to the constitutionality of that legislation).
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emphasizes the role of international obligations of the United States in
the interpretation of the Copyright Clause.159
In the present context, however, it is also important to recognize
that the Berne Convention emphasizes both territoriality as a
structural matter and effective protection of the rights of authors as a
governing substantive concern. As the Ninth Circuit in Subafilms
pointed out, national treatment and territoriality are important
premises upon which the international copyright regime is built. But
they are not the only ones. The Berne Convention arose from a desire
to protect authors' rights. This is evidenced in the 1883 statement
from the Swiss government, inviting other nations to participate in the
process of drafting an international copyright treaty:
The protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic
works (literary and artistic property) is becoming more and more
the object of International Conventions. It is, in fact, in the nature
of things that the work of man's genius, once it has seen the light,
can no longer be restricted to one country and to one nationality. If
it possesses any value, it is not long in spreading itself in all
countries, under forms which may vary more or less, but which,
however, leave in its essence and its principal manifestations the
creative idea. This is why, after all civilized States have recognised
and guaranteed by their domestic legislation the right of writer and
of artist over his work, the imperative necessity has been shown of
protecting this right in international relations, which multiply and
grow daily. 160
That general purpose, internationalist in its aspirations, is
affirmed by the preamble of the Convention, which now states that
the nations of the Berne Union are "equally animated by the desire to
protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as possible, the rights of
authors in their literary and artistic works literary and artistic
works."'161 While the national treatment principle was adopted quite
early in the treaty drafting process, 162 and, as a structural and
normative matter, remains critical to international intellectual
property relations, 163 we should be wary of the possibility that
159. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
160. December 1883, circular note from the Swiss Government to the governments of 'all
civilized nations.' Reprinted in Actes de la Confirence internationale pour la protection des
droits d'auteur runie b Berne du 8 au 19 Septembre 1884 (1884) ('Actes 1884'), 8-9, cited in
SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS: 1888-1986, 54 (1987).
161. Berne Convention, supra note 51, Preamble.
162. See RICKETSON, supra note 160, at 74.
163. See generally Austin, Domestic Self-Determination, supra note 78.
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formalistic adherence to territoriality might undermine meaningful
protection of authors' rights, which is precisely the idea that explicitly
animates the Convention.
If public international law norms are to influence the
development of domestic conflict of laws principles, courts should not
always be impeded in imposing liability for indirect infringement in
contexts in which the decision might have extraterritorial effects.
Greater cognizance of the international legal context might also
prompt reticence about developing policy positions such as those
adopted by Justice Breyer in Grokster. In cases where the
development of liability standards will have obvious extraterritorial
effects, it might be appropriate to give more consideration to the
extraterritorial implications of doctrinal commitments and their likely
impacts on the international copyright regime in which the United
States now plays such a significant part.
The public international law relating directly to copyright is not,
however, the only source of relevant principles that might inform the
development of domestic doctrine that responds appropriately to
forms of infringement that are international in character and that have
significant potential to impact other nations. A number of scholars
and international and domestic agencies are becoming increasingly
interested in the role that human rights norms might play in the
development of intellectual property law. 164 The 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the foundational document for modern
human rights law, announces authors' rights to their "moral and
material interests" in their "scientific, literary or artistic
production[s]."' 165 In the mid-1960s, a similar clause was included in
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
which has now been ratified by nearly 150 nations (though not the
United States).
There are internal contradictions and tensions between many of
the governing international human rights principles as they touch on
164. See generally Audrey R. Chapman, A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual
Property, Scientific Progress, and Access to the Benefits of Science, Panel Discussion on
Intellectual Property and Human Rights, at 3 (Nov. 8, 1998),
http://www.wipo.org/globalissues/events/1998/humanrights/papers/index.htm. Lawrence Heifer,
Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual
Property Law Making, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004); Lawrence Helfer, Collective Management
of Copyright and Human Rights: An Uneasy Alliance, COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS, (Daniel J. Gervais, ed., Kluwer Law International 2006),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=816984.
165. Id.
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intellectual property issues. 166 The major instruments are themselves
informed by both a concern to protect authors' interests, and a policy
that the benefits of creativity should be widely shared. Importantly,
international human rights law also confirms that everyone has the
right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to
enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its
benefits. 167 Given the potential for P2P products and services that
facilitate massive unlicensed reproduction and dissemination of
copyright protected materials to disrupt the protections guaranteed to
authors under the public international copyright regime, that regime is
unlikely to provide a fertile source for legal principles that might
facilitate their development. However, if P2P products and services
become more generally protective of authors' rights and facilitate
participation in the cultural life of the community, so that people can
more readily enjoy the arts and share in scientific advancement and its
benefits, human rights law may assist in our thinking about how the
balance between authors and technology is to be struck.168
For those who think that copyrights-and other intellectual
property rights-are too powerful, analysis grounded on human rights
offer important advantages: The public international law on
intellectual property treats protection of intellectual property rights as
a universal, internationally applicable principle. Limited exceptions
under domestic legal systems are permissible, but their development
and justifications are usually localized to the particular jurisdiction
166. See Heifer, supra note 164. See also Maria Green, Drafting history of article 15(1)(c)
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at 12-13 (Oct. 9, 2000)
E/C. 12/2000/15, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/872a8f7775c9823cc1 256999005c3088?Opendocument
(exploring the paucity of analysis of the relationship between public and private interests in the
context of the drafting of art. 15(l)(c)). The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights has produced a General Comment on the interpretation of some aspects of art. 15(l)(c).
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The right of everyone to benefit from the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author (art. 15(1)(c) of the Covenant), General Comment No. 17
(Nov. 21, 2005) [hereinafter General Comment], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/03902145edbbe797c 125711500584ea8/SFILE/G0640060.p
df.
167. See United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966 (effective Jan. 3, 1976), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/acescr.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). These aspects of
article 15 have not yet received interpretation in a General Comment.
168. As Professor Ginsburg has suggested, this balance between the rights of copyright
owners and the interests of those who develop new methods of dissemination has been a
persistent concern in U.S. copyright jurisprudence. See Ginsburg, supra note 129. It is possible
that international law might offer further insight into how that balance is to be calibrated.
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that adopts them: public international intellectual property
instruments do not invite development of a broader international
consensus about the appropriate scope of exceptions to copyright
owners' rights. 169 In contrast, if international human rights law can
provide a source of values and principles that can serve as
counterweights to the international copyright system, these may have
greater international purchase, given the universal aspirations of the
international human rights system. 170
If P2P products and services develop in ways that genuinely
favour wide legitimate distribution of the fruits of human creativity,
while at the same time respecting the rights of those responsible for
their production-ensuring meaningful, not merely symbolic
protections-it may be possible to derive principles from international
human rights law and international intellectual property law that are
more supportive of new technologies of reproduction, search, and
dissemination. In the conflict of laws context, such principles might
sometimes swing the pendulum back in favour of territoriality, a
principle that supports the idea that different nations are entitled to do
things differently as circumstances require. 171 It might also encourage
courts to consider more carefully the extraterritorial effects of their
holdings-both de jure and de facto-and legislatures to be more
reticent about localizing foreign intellectual property infringements in
ways that have significant potential to affect other nations' copyright
regimes.
Promoters of P2P products and services, along with other groups
including activists, litigants, and a number of academics, have made
sustained efforts in recent years to challenge the idea that copyright
protection, and intellectual property protection generally, is founded
169. See generally, Rochelle Dreyfuss and Graeme Dinwoodie, International Intellectual
Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 431 (2004).
170. In some respects, human rights standards may be more exacting than the approach to
limitations under the traditional public international law of intellectual property. For example,
the General Comment, supra note 166 at para. 22-24, requires limitations to be "strictly
necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in a democratic society," and the means
adopted to be "proportionate," and adopt the least restrictive means to achieve such ends.
However, as Professor Larry Heifer points out, the right of authors to be protected under human
rights norms may be quite limited. In broad summary, the General Comment focuses on the
rights of humans (not corporations), and emphasizes the fight of authors to an adequate standard
of living from their work. See Laurence R. Heifer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for
Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2006-07), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-891303.
171. See id. (discussing opportunities for distinct national approaches to intellectual
property protections to develop in the shadow of the General Comment).
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on unassailable societal norms. 172 This is part of the politics of
contemporary intellectual property law, and may make the argument
that failure to provide robust copyright protection in global markets
being an offense against the "international order" seem somewhat
tenuous. 173 Equally, however, a sustainable "Kazaa Revolution" is
unlikely to be one that defies the international copyright system.
Whatever its rhetorical appeal, the rallying cry of "it's cool to
infringe" is not the stuff from which coherent governing norms are
likely to develop in an increasingly interconnected world - not, at
least, of the type that will appeal to most legal actors. One of the
major criticisms levelled at the Kazaa and Grokster decisions is that
they are not "technology-friendly."' 174 But technological friendliness
has not yet caught on as a principle around which an international
judicial or legislative consensus has coalesced that would justify
undermining the more established consensus focused on protecting
authors' rights in international commerce. 175
The challenge is to develop new principles and norms that
provide alternative visions of the international copyright order,
articulated in a form that is likely to make sense to legal actors tasked
with developing doctrine that responds to the threats to the
international copyright order posed by P2P technologies. Until that
work is done-if it can be done-the more venerable norms articulated
in the public international law of copyright should govern.
172. Even so, aspects of copyright infringement have been criminalized, and prosecutions
continue. See, e.g., Joris Evers, Software Pirate to Pay 1.1 Million, CNET, Sept. 28, 1995,
http://news.com.com/2100-1029_3-5884914.html (discussing a plea bargain in a software piracy
prosecution initiated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Houston Police).
173. HIGGINS, supra note 150, at 58.
174. This criticism of the Australian decision was quickly made by Professor Kim
Weatherall of Melbourne University School of Law in her regular blog on current intellectual
property issues: Weatherall's Law,
http://weatherall.blogspot.com/2005_09_01_weatherallarchive.html#l 12592939140783823.
175. Of course, free availability of copyright protected works may be very difficult, if not
impossible, to reconcile with the Berne Convention "three-step test," by which exceptions to
copyright owners' rights are tested in international law. The three-step test governs other major
intellectual property instruments. See, e.g., article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement, supra note 104.
In the Berne Convention, the three step test is in article 9(2), which provides "It shall be a matter
for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author." In recent work,
some scholars are contesting whether the legal instruments constituting the international
intellectual property and world trade system are a "hermetically sealed" system, or whether
there is scope for account to be taken of other public international law instruments and laws. See
generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
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V. CONCLUSION
Neither the Federal Court of Australia in Kazaa nor the U.S.
Supreme Court in Grokster engaged directly with the international
implications of liability theories that respond to unlicensed P2P
products and services. However, the international context pertains to
both the facts that are relevant to the application of the theories and
the potential effects of their application. Many of the primary
infringers, whose activities justify the imposition of liability, are
likely to be located beyond the forum; and the liability theories
themselves and remedies imposed by the court have the potential to
impact the conduct of Internet users in every jurisdiction that they are
located. But even theories that are less protective of copyrights and
more supportive of technological development have the potential to
have significant international effects, as the discussion of Justice
Breyer's Grokster concurrence explains.
In future cases, if Australian or U.S. courts were to confront the
international aspects of these liability theories more directly, they
would find significant support in doctrine and legislative principles
for adopting an expansive, extraterritorial approach. In the United
States, where the legislature has not localized foreign infringement in
the same way as has been achieved under Australian law, the
territoriality principle has become increasingly contested, both in
copyright and other branches of intellectual property law. As a result,
courts have significant freedom to depart from the territoriality
premise. One source for principles that might guide this doctrinal
evolution is the public international law of copyright. International
copyright law has meaningful protection of copyrights as its
foundational principle, even though it is also premised on
territoriality. Of course, as Justice Breyer's opinion in Grokster
indicates, domestic lawmakers might view copyright law and policy
differently and develop doctrine that is not consistent with
international intellectual property norms. Given the significant
potential for such doctrinal positions to affect policy decisions
adopted in other nations, this doctrine might be more supportable if it
were grounded in concepts and principles around which an
international consensus might coalesce.
* * *
